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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
1.

Plaintiff/Appellant Coulter & Smith, Ltd. (hereafter "Coulter & Smith")

2.

Defendants/Appellees Roger Russell and Kristen Russell (hereafter

sometimes collectively "Russell").
3.

No other named defendants are a party to this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Statute of Frauds

precluded enforcement of the parties' Agreement.

The trial court's legal conclusion was

predicated primarily on improper factual findings that were made only by ignoring evidence that
Coulter & Smith presented to the trial court. Because disposition of a case on summary
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, this court must review the evidence in the
light most favorable to Coulter & Smith, and reverse because there were genuine disputes as to
material issues of fact that preclude Russell from obtaining summary judgment as a matter of
law. U.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Themv v. Seagull Enterprises. Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Hunt
v. ESI Engineering. Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991). Moreover, since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, this
court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions to the facts as viewed in the light
most favorable to Coulter & Smith. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its opposition to Russell's
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at R. 230-236.
2.

The trial court improperly found, despite conflicting affidavits that the parties had

submitted, that a "reasonable" time for exercise of the option had passed. On review of a grant
of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as that applied
by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). The presence of factual

1

disputes precludes summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott. 562 P.2d 238 (Utah
1977). This issue was preserved in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its opposition to
Russell's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alt. for Summary Judgment at R. 239, 256, and in its
Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, R. 362.
3.

The trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law that the parties' Agreement

violated the rule against perpetuities. This is a conclusion of law which this court must review
for correctness without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar,
supra, Froerer, supra. This issue was preserved in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its
opposition to Russell's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alt. for Summary Judgment at R. 238-40.
4.

The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Agreement was not

supported by any consideration. The trial court's legal conclusion was predicated primarily on
an improper factual finding that Russell received no benefit as a result of Coulter & Smith's
promises and efforts made in reliance on the Agreement. This court must review the evidence
in the light most favorable to Coulter & Smith, and reverse because there were genuine disputes
as to material issues of fact that preclude Russell from obtaining summary judgment as a matter
of law. U.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Themv v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., supra. Hunt v. ESI Engineering,
Inc., supra. Additionally, this court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion that
the Agreement lacked consideration. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., supra. This issue was preserved
in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its opposition to Russell's Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment at R. 240-41, and in its Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment at R. 362-63.

2

DETERMINATIVE CITATIONS
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
The judgment sought [pursuant to Rule 56] shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Coulter & Smith seeks enforcement of written

agreement to purchase certain real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Coulter
& Smith was to develop and subdivide the real property and to pay Russell for the individual
lots after the subdivision development and upon the sale of each lot. Based upon the Agreement,
Coulter & Smith invested substantial funds and efforts to develop the real property.
Later on, despite the Agreement and Coulter & Smith's substantial investment,
Russell refused to honor the Agreement, and the suit below was filed to compel its enforcement.
At the same time as they filed their answer to the complaint (R. 123-129) and
before any discovery had been commenced or conducted, Russell filed a "Motion to Dismiss or,
In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment" (R. 104-122). After a hearing, the trial court
granted Russell's motion, not as one to dismiss, but as a summary judgment. The trial court
then entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 453-457), and a Judgment in favor
of Russell,1 declaring that Coulter & Smith had no claim or interest in the real property that is
1

Defendant/Appellee Kristen Russell was joined in the suit after the hearing on the Motion
to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, at the same time as entry of the final
judgment (R. 000386, 000462).
3

the subject of the action and dismissing Coulter & Smith's claims, with prejudice (R. 461-463).
The trial court's judgment was entered as of May 16, 1995 (R. 463). Coulter & Smith filed its
Notice of Appeal on June 8, 1995 (R. 464-465).
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Coulter & Smith and Roger Russell entered into an agreement in the spring of 1991
whereby Coulter & Smith was to develop in concert with other real property it owned in the
immediate area, a 3.67-acre parcel of property owned (or controlled) by Russell (the "3.67-Acre
Parcel") (R. 217, 12; R. 218, 16; R. 341-343). After the 3.67 Acre Parcel had been developed
and subdivided, Coulter & Smith was to pay for the individual lots to be located within the
subdivided 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 217,15; R. 343,19). The agreement allowed Russell to obtain
a greater purchase price for the 3.67-Acre Parcel because the parcel was worth considerably
more developed, with dense zoning, allowing the maximum number of lots to be established on
the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 344, 110). Thus, the parties agreed that the purchase price of the
3.67-Acre Parcel would be determined and paid after the subdivision development and upon the
sale of each subdivided lot.

(R. 217, 15; R. 343, 19).

The parties' agreement was

memorialized on or about April 27, 1991 in a letter agreement signed by both parties (the
"Agreement") (R. 217, 13). (Exhibit "A" hereto).
The Agreement was the result of negotiations between Coulter & Smith and Russell to
develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel in conjunction with other real property that Coulter & Smith
owned in the area (R. 342-343). Russell had previously engaged engineers to design a layout
for the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a "stand-alone" development. Russell faced major obstacles in
developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel in this fashion, for the property had no storm drain outlet and
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its engineers redesign the storm drainage system to enlarge the line and install portions of it
deeper in order to accommodate development of the 3.67-Acre Parcel. The extra cost of this
redesigned system was approximately $20,000.00 (R. 345, f 12). Coulter & Smith undertook
these activities and expended this additional $35,000.00 as a direct result of the Agreement (R.
345, 112).
In addition to its activities described above, Coulter & Smith went to work on acquiring
the additional four parcels. The difficulties in the negotiations were continually reported to
Russell, and when the additional four parcels were not acquired by the Spring of 1992, Coulter
& Smith consulted with Russell regularly on a weekly or biweekly basis. During all of this
time, Russell encouraged Coulter & Smith to continue its efforts and understood and acquiesced
in the time needed to accomplish this difficult task. (R. 218, 18; R. 219, 1112, 13, 14; R. 346,
114).
In late October or early November 1992, Coulter & Smith had signed contracts with two
of the four owners of the additional parcels, and had negotiated agreements with the other two
owners. (R. 219-220,114; R. 346, 115) At that point, while making one of his regular progress
reports to Russell, Coulter & Smith was told by Russell that he (Russell) had been by contacted
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints ("LDS Church") and that he (Russell) intended
to sell the property to the LDS Church. (R. 219-220, 114; R. 346, 114).
Coulter & Smith considered Russell's intent to sell the property to the LDS Church to
be a breach of the Agreement. But in order to resolve their differences, Coulter & Smith agreed
to attempt to negotiate a three-way settlement. In fact, Russell, recognizing Coulter & Smith's
contractual interest in the 3.67-Acre Parcel, had his attorney draft the three-way settlement

6

documents (R J" II), "11 " l" "I if iwleh however, the I ,DS Church realized that there were certain
difficulties in building on the 3.67-Acre Parcel, and it ultimately withdrew its offer for the 3.67Acre Parcel and relocated its building plans lu >lhei propoil t' ('nulla A" Smith owmn
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE NO. 1.
The Statute of Frauds does not prevent enforcement
The trial court erred in ruling that the Statute of Frauds applied w prevent enforcement
of this Agreement

There was no dispute between the parties as u

:i;i : _ . , -\K

Agreement referenced, ;m<l Ihe lu;il eourl even made a factual finding 'that 'the Agreement
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the contract. Because there was no dispute between the p^nes a .
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Agreement to cover, the extrinsic evidence was sufficiently definite to show that there was a
mutual agreement between the parties which may be specifically enforced by the Court.
The trial court also erred in not ruling that Coulter & Smith's partial performance also
takes the Agreement outside of the Statute of Frauds. The statute itself indicates that the powers
of courts to compel specific performance of agreements in case of partial performance is not
abrogated by the Statute of Frauds. Coulter & Smith took substantial steps toward developing
the 3.67-Acre Parcel in accordance with the Agreement. The benefits to Russell as a result of
Coulter & Smith's efforts are significant. This part performance is sufficient to remove the
Agreement from the Statute of Frauds.
The trial court also erred in not finding that Russell should be equitably estopped from
attacking the validity of the Agreement under the Statute of Frauds. Under Utah law, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the Statute of Frauds from being used by a party to defeat
a just and equitable cause against him, where the party has accepted the benefits of an
agreement. In reliance upon the Agreement, Coulter & Smith undertook steps to improve and
develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a part of the entire subdivision, steps he would not have taken
unless Russell had signed the Agreement. Russell has accepted these benefits and therefore
should be equitably estopped from asserting any alleged ambiguity in the property description
as a defense to Coulter & Smith's proper claim for specific enforcement.
ISSUE NO. 2.
The Trial Court Improperly Ruled that
A Reasonable Time for Exercise of the Option had Passed,
Summary judgment may not be granted when there are genuine disputes over material
issues of fact. The trial court improperly ruled over conflicting affidavits presented by both
8

parties (h.if as ol the January 1995 hearing date, a reasonable time for exercise of the option had
passed. The trial court's ruling ignored, the conflicts in the evidence and also ignored factors
luivniid i.'oullu Ai .Siimli'1

• "ul winch would iiilluniix vviiuf constitutes a "reasonable" time

•frame. The trial court's ru -n^ on this issue should be reversed.
ISSUE NO. 3.
I he Rule Against Perpetuities does not operate
to prevent enforcement of this Agreement.
The trial court also m ^ iiu\ ilk, Agreement may not *_ ^pecnieally enforced because
i! vmlaies (lie Mile against perpetuities. However, 'the rule against perpetuities has been sharply
curtailed in modern times when s^jclit to ^e applied to c ommercui ! transactions
c(

* • .j. •• •

•

i^ •
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When a
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agreement.
Tn this case, the fact that the trial court did make a tactual finding as i
re JM>I- *H. :'.

>s<si:-

il

»d.* , - wlv- ^Sic rule against perpetuities has not been violated. Despite

conflicting evidence, the in.u ^ouri (improperly) found, that four years was the time period within
•< .r» *

^ * il within the perpetuities

period, the Agreement COL A not. as A :uatt< . r\ i ^
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ISSUE 4.
'I'he Agreement was Supported by Ample Consideration.
The trial court erroneously concluded, despite disputed evidence, that the Agreement was

Smith's promises to assist Russell in resolving the difficulties he had, faced, in, developing the
9

3.67-Acre Parcel. Coulter & Smith went to substantial effort to incorporate the 3.67-Acre
Parcel into its own development, a task that it need not have undertook absent the Agreement.
The trial court's resolution of this factual dispute on summary judgment should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION WAS NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS,
A.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE
PARTIES AGREED UPON WHICH PROPERTY WAS TO BE
TRANSFERRED, AND THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED A DEFINITE
MEANS BY WHICH THE REMAINING DETAILS WOULD BE FIXED.

The trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law in this case that the Agreement
between the parties was unenforceable because the number of lots and the price to be paid was
"deficient":
1. Although the legal description of the overall parcel owned by Russell
is sufficient, the purported option is deficient as to the number of lots and as to
the price to be paid, and therefore, the purported option is unenforceable.
(Conclusion of Law No. 1, R. 455). This legal conclusion was predicated upon the following
(improper) factual finding that the trial court made by ignoring the language of the Agreement
and Coulter & Smith's further evidence that fixed these details:
4. The purported option does not specify how many lots are to be
developed on the Property so that the ultimate size and number of the lots to be
sold (or controlled) is uncertain, as is the price to be paid for the entire parcel.
(Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 454).

The trial court's rulings are contrary to the law that

interprets the Statute of Frauds2 and to the evidence presented to the trial court.

2

The trial court's conclusion of law did not specifically indicate that the Statute of Frauds
was the basis on which it found the Agreement unenforceable. However, the Statute of Frauds
(continued...)
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Reed, v. Alve>.

••
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In Continental Bank and Trust v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890
(1955) we explained: ". . . where, because of vagueness or [ambiguity] in the
language used, the intent of the parties is in question, the court may consider the
situation of the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the
contract, the purpose of its execution, and. respective claims thereunder, to
ascertain why the parties intended." 291 P.2d at 891-92.
KCCU v . / V i v e

For example

).

in the following cases, the Utah Supreme Court, relying on extrinsic

evidence concerning the parties knowledge J» I" ulul l.'ii'i \\AS in "h'cd ordnvd specific
performance of contracts containing the following identifications of land:
*•

"[CJorner of Hillview and Ninth East.'

1,

" ? I -. )la,

^ccu \ . Aive>. ;

(420 acre Hackford Farm), Uintah County, State of Uu ; J i."

Hackford v. Snow, iVt ' II111 "'ill III} II, III,"" i I I, I11 nil

VW?.)\ •

-(...continued;
was the only argument that Russell made to the trial court that was predicated on an alleged
deficiency in the number of lots and the price to be paid. Coulter & Smith does not anticipate
that Russell will raise anything other than the Statute of Frauds on appeal to support the trial
court's (erroneous) legal conclusion. However, not having argued any other issue below,
Russell would be precluded from arguing on this appeal anything other than the Statute of
Frauds. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (UtahCt. App. 1991) (appellate courts
will not consider arguments that were not raised before the trial conn*
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c.

n

[U]p in the old field, now under fence above Spring Branch

Ditch." Jacobson v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714, 721 (Utah 1949);
d.

"[RJesidence 106 Pacific, oka 106 Lumbar Yard." Park West

Village. Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Utah 1986).
See also. Stauffer v. Call. 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) (legal description may be based on the
contract description and other extrinsic or parol evidence). Thus, when reviewing a contract for
the sale of land to determine its enforceability under the Statute of Frauds, the trial court should
look first to the language of the contract, and then to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties'
intent.
In applying this principle to the case at bar, the trial court, correctly, looked first to the
Agreement between the parties.

On Coulter & Smith letterhead, the Agreement reads as

follows:
Dear Dr. Russell:
In response to your request for a written proposal to purchase your lots
west of 1700 East at 10800 South, I submit the following offer which you may
accept by signing below:
Price: $26,500 per lot during the 1st month following completion of the
lots; price of each lot to increase $100 per lot each month thereafter until each
lot is closed.
Upon completion of the subdivision development we offer to pay you
$1,500 per lot; the balance of the purchase price ($25,000 at the outset) to be
paid upon closing of each lot. We understand that the cost of the land and the
lot improvements will be paid upon closing of each lot.
The enclosed Work Exchange Agreement will initiate our cooperative
efforts. We will proceed posthaste to annex and develop our tracts jointly. I
believe that working in concert will greatly facilitate zoning and all other
development concerns.
Respectfully,
\s\ Nathan Coulter
Coulter & Smith Ltd. is hereby granted an option to purchase lots as per terms
detailed above: This option terminates 2 years from the date of completion of the
subdivision.
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\s\ Dr. Roger Russell 4/27/91
(R. 217, f3; R. 222) (Appendix I hereto). The language within the Agreement which allowed
the property to be identified is the boundary set by 1700 East at 10800 South and the recognition
that the lots are not yet developed. The extrinsic evidence that completes the identification is
Russell's own admission that the 3.67-Acre Parcel is the property that is the subject of the
Agreement. Russell has acknowledged throughout this litigation, both below and on appeal, that
the property that is the subject of the Agreement is the 3.67-Acre Parcel. (See, e.g., R. 69-70;
R. 268; Memorandum in Support of Russell's Motion for Affirmance, p. 2 (Introduction), p.
3 (paragraphs 3-5)). Coulter & Smith acknowledges the same. (R. 217, f2). There simply is
no dispute between the parties as to what real property the Agreement referenced. The trial
court reflected that lack of dispute in its Finding of Fact No 2:
2. The purported option refers to a 3.67 acre parcel owned (or controlled)
by Russell in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
(R. 454). The parties being in complete agreement as to what property was to be sold, the
Agreement is sufficiently definite to constitute a mutual agreement between the parties which
may be specifically enforced.
But despite the parties' agreement as to the property to be sold, despite the trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 2 that the option referenced the 3.67-Acre Parcel, and despite the trial
court's own legal conclusion that the legal description of the overall parcel 3.67-Acre Parcel was
sufficient, (Conclusion of Law No. 1, R. 455), the trial court incorrectly held that the
Agreement violated the Statute of Frauds because of an uncertainty as to the ultimate size and
number of lots to be sold and the price to be paid. This ruling ignored the evidence and relied
on an incorrect interpretation of the Statute of Frauds.
13

In ruling that the Agreement violated the Statute of Frauds, the trial court ignored the fact
that the parties had agreed on all material details required for transfer of the property. The
parties had agreed that they would work together "in concert [to] facilitate zoning. . ."
(Agreement). The parties had agreed that they would seek the maximum number of lots from
the governmental authorities, hoping that they could develop eight to ten lots. (R. 217-18, 15,
R. 344, f 10), The parties had agreed that the price to be paid was to be $26,500.00 for each
of the lots that were ultimately developed. (Agreement). The parties had agreed that Coulter
& Smith had an option to buy all, not just some of the lots.3 Implicit in the parties' agreement
was their recognition that a governmental determination of the exact number of lots to be
developed was necessary. But this provision of the Agreement does not violate the Statute of
Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds does not require that all terms of the contract be set forth in the
written agreement. When the contract provides a definite means by which the remaining details
can be fixed without further agreement of the parties, the Statute of Frauds will not void the
contract. Calder v. Third Judicial District Court, 273 P.2d 157 (Utah 1954). In Calder, the
parties had agreed that the buyer would select 200 acres from a larger tract of land. Precisely
as in the case before this court, there was no question in Calder that the larger tract of land was
sufficiently described. The only uncertainty remaining in the Calder contract was which parcel
of land within the bigger tract would be transferred. The parties had left the choice up to the

3

The Agreement itself provides that Coulter & Smith would be purchasing "your lots," and
refers throughout to "each lot" as being the subject of the Agreement. (R. 222; Appendix I).
Russell's own affidavit indicates that Coulter & Smith agreed to "develop the property into
subdivided lots and purchase those lots pursuant to [the Agreement]." (R. 70, 16). (See, also,
R. 70, 117 and 9).
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buyer's discretion. Thus, the issue in Calder was whether the Statute of Frauds had been
violated because the property that was ultimately to be transferred was uncertain as of the date
of the agreement, it being up to the buyer to make his choice at a later date. IdL at 169. The
Utah Supreme Court found that the contract did not violate the Statute of Frauds, because the
right to make the selection gave a specific means to which the parties had agreed by which the
particular property to be conveyed could be definitely located. IcL at 170. Thus, the writing
was a valid, enforceable contract, and the trial court's dismissal of the claim for specific
performance was overruled. IdL at 171.4
Furthermore, specific performance may be ordered even where a defined lot may have
not been existence at the time the agreement was executed. Bellevue College v. Greater Omaha
Realty Co., 348 N.W.2d 837 (Neb. 1984).

In that case, the parties had agreed that

"approximately two acres of [Greater Omaha's] property adjacent to Betz Road" would be
conveyed to Belle vue College. The trial court's decision, affirmed on appeal, ordered Greater
Omaha to convey a specific lot to Belle vue College, which lot had not been in existence at the
time of the option, but had subsequently been developed by Greater Omaha:
There is, we believe, sufficient evidence to permit the court to order specific
performance. The location of Betz Road is known and is definite and
ascertainable. Likewise, the amount of ground to be conveyed to Belle vue
College is ascertainable. Furthermore, it appears from an examination of certain
of the preliminary plats that the property ordered by the trial court to be conveyed
by Greater Omaha to Bellevue College is exactly the land which was designated
by Greater Omaha as a specific lot in exhibits 15 and 15, first as Lot 40 and then

4

Cf. Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) (Statute of Frauds violated
where size, shape and description of property to be conveyed left to future agreement of parties);
and Davison v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973) (Statute of Frauds violated where contract
is expressly contingent on future negotiation as to how much of the 150 acres the sellers would
be able to reserve).
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as Lot 41. While the record is unclear as to whether the location of the lot to be
conveyed was in existence at the time the letter agreement was entered into, it is
clear that the land ordered conveyed by the trial court coincides exactly with a lot
designed by Greater Omaha abutting Betz Road and containing approximately 2
acres. The evidence leaves no doubt that, at least in the minds of the developers,
what ultimately became Lot 41 was intended to be, at some point, conveyed to
Bellevue College in satisfaction of . . . the letter agreement.
Id, at 841.
In the case before this court, while the lots may not yet have been developed at the time
of execution of the Agreement, the evidence presented was that the parties intended that Coulter
& Smith have an option on all of the lots ultimately developed within the 3.67-Acre Parcel, not
just some of the lots, or just one of the lots, as was the case in Bellevue College. The writing
between the parties in the instant case and the extrinsic evidence that was presented to the trial
court make it clear that Coulter & Smith had an option to buy the entire 3.67-Acre Parcel and
all of the lots developed within it. The only contingency in the Agreement was how many lots
would ultimately be allowed by governmental authorities.

The method provided in the

Agreement for fixing the purchase price was to first obtain the decision of the governmental
authorities and then multiply that number by $26,500.00. The method of determining the
remaining contingency having been fixed at the time, the Agreement is sufficient to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds.
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is not to perpetrate a fraud. Where, as here, there
is no dispute between the parties as to what property is to be transferred, the Statute of Frauds
should not be used to avoid that agreement. The trial court's rulings that the Agreement is
deficient and violative of the Statute of Frauds should be reversed.
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B.

COULTER & SMITH HAS PARTIALLY PERFORMED
UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THEREBY TAKING THIS
TRANSACTION OUTSIDE OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

By part performance, even without a writing, a contract can be taken outside of the
Statute of Frauds. As recognized in the statute itself:
Nothing in this chapter [Statute of Frauds] contained shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of
part performance.
U.C. A. §25-5-8. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to the facts at hand, because Coulter &
Smith's work in developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel constitute sufficient part performance to take
the Agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
The trial court rejected this argument below, erroneously finding that work that Coulter
& Smith performed in reliance on the Agreement was not a detriment to Coulter & Smith. The
trial court's findings of fact on this issue are as follows:
12. Coulter & Smith did work to establish a subdivision, but it was not
work done strictly to enhance the value of the Property, [emphasis added].
13. Coulter & Smith's work to establish a subdivision was not a detriment
to Coulter & Smith because it enhanced the value of its own property.
(R. 455).

These findings, however, belie the evidence that Coulter & Smith undertook

substantial steps toward developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel that it would not have taken in the
absence of the Agreement, and that Russell reaped significant benefit from this work. For
example, Coulter & Smith had its engineers redesign the entire subdivision and storm drain
systems to accommodate incorporation of the 3.67-Acre Parcel into the subdivision (R. 218-219,
f9; R. 345, if 12). Coulter & Smith rallied neighborhood support for its access re-route plan,
and then conducted extensive negotiations with Sandy City to adopt the plan. IcL This plan,
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eventually approved by Sandy City, demonstrated the feasibility of two access points to the 3.67Acre Parcel, and solved one of the development problems that Russell had faced prior to
entering into the Agreement. Id. Coulter & Smith also deepened the sanitary sewer from its
original plans to allow for hookups from future lots on the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 345, f 12).
Coulter & Smith's efforts taken in reliance on the Agreement cost Coulter & Smith in excess
of $30,000.00 (R. 345, 112). The evidence presented to the trial court was that Russell received
a direct benefit from Coulter & Smith's activities, because Sandy City would require that Russell
utilize the facilities that Coulter & Smith installed in any future development of the 3.67-Acre
Parcel. (R. 345-46, 113). Contrary to the trial court's finding, there was no evidence presented
by either party that Coulter & Smith's work enhanced the value of Coulter & Smith's own
property. In fact, the evidence presented by Coulter & Smith was that it would not have
performed this work absent the Agreement with Russell (R. 219, \9\ R. 345, f 12).
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether or not Coulter & Smith also benefitted, along with
Russell from the work that was performed.5 The Agreement required Coulter & Smith to
resolve Russell's development difficulties and to incorporate the 3.67 Acre Parcel into the
overall development. Coulter & Smith's actions toward that end were substantial, and were
taken in accordance with and because of the Agreement. Those actions constitute sufficient part
performance to take the Agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. See, LeGrand Johnson Corp.
v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1971) (advancement of $44,000.00 toward development of
quarries constitutes sufficient performance to remove the contract from Statute of Frauds). The
trial court's (unfounded) factual findings that Coulter & Smith's work to incorporate Russell's

5

The usual purpose for entering into a contract is the mutual benefit of both parties.
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property also enhanced the value of its own property are simply irrelevant to whether Coulter
& Smith partly performed the Agreement.
The trial court's factual findings on this issue ignore Coulter & Smith's evidence to the
contrary, that the work performed was, in fact, a detriment to Coulter & Smith. Furthermore,
it is improper for the trial court to make factual findings on summary judgment. Thus, these
findings should be reversed and the issue remanded for trial.
Alternatively, implicit in the trial court's factual findings is that Coulter & Smith's work
was done as part of its performance obligations under the Agreement, even if Coulter & Smith
also benefitted from the work. Coulter & Smith's part performance takes the Agreement out
of the Statute of Frauds.

Thus, the trial court's legal conclusion that the Agreement is

unenforceable as a violation of the Statute of Frauds, must be reversed.
C.

DUE TO HIS ACTIONS,

RUSSELL

SHOULD BE

EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE
VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT.

In Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714, 722-23 (Utah 1949), the Utah Supreme Court held
that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Statute of Frauds may not be used by a party
to defeat a just and equitable cause against him, where the party has accepted the benefits of an
agreement.
As explained above, the evidence of record was that as a result of the Agreement, Russell
obtained significant benefits. The parties had a deal, and in reliance on that deal, Coulter &
Smith undertook substantial steps to improve and develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a part of the
entire subdivision. Coulter & Smith presented evidence that Russell would benefit from Coulter
& Smith's work that was performed in reliance on the Agreement. Any future development by
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Russell of the 3.67-Acre Parcel will be allowed, indeed, required, to utilize the improvements
that Coulter & Smith installed at its own considerable expense. Thus, Russell benefitted from
Coulter & Smith's efforts, regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit. (R. 345-46, 113)
Based upon the benefits that Russell received, the trial court's ruling that the Agreement
is unenforceable as a violation of the Statute of Frauds should be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT A REASONABLE
TIME PERIOD HAD PASSED FOR EXERCISE OF THE OPTION.

Despite conflicting affidavits that the parties had submitted on the issue of when the
Agreement was to be consummated and the property transferred, the trial court improperly ruled
that as of the January 1995 hearing date, a reasonable time for exercise of the option had passed
(R. 455, Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 456, Conclusion of Law No. 4). These factual findings
were improperly made on summary judgment and should be vacated by this court, as should all
legal conclusions based on these improper factual findings.6 Themv v. Seagull Enterprises,
Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Hunt v. ESI Engineering. Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (UtahCt. App.),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
The evidence as to when the parties contemplated transfer of the property to Coulter &
Smith was disputed. Russell submitted an affidavit indicating that the option was to have been

6

The trial court's legal conclusions based on these improper factual findings are (a) that
the rule against perpetuities has been violated (R. 456; First Conclusion of Law No. 4); that any
offer to sell was withdrawn (R. 456; Second Conclusion of Law No. 4); and that the option had
lapsed because a reasonable time had passed without the purchase taking place (R. 456;
Conclusions of Law Nos. 6 and 7). For the most part, these conclusions of law fail without
further legal analysis simply because they are predicated on the improper factual finding as to
what constituted a reasonable time within which the option could be exercised. The trial court's
ruling on the rule against perpetuities, however, requires further analysis, which is set forth
below.
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exercised by the Spring of 1992 (R. 70, f 6). Coulter & Smith's evidence was that the parties
intended the subdivision development to be accomplished with all due diligence, and hopefully
the option could be exercised by the Spring of 1992 (R. 219, f 12; R. 346, 114). Coulter &
Smith's evidence also indicated that with Russell's acquiescence and encouragement, Coulter &
Smith continued its development efforts after the Spring of 1992 and that Coulter & Smith was
ready to file formal application for annexation with Sandy City in December 1992. (R. 219-20,
ft 12, 13, and 18; R. 346, 16). The trial court ignored this conflict in the evidence, and also
ignored factors beyond Coulter & Smith's control which would influence what constitutes a
"reasonable" time frame, including the negotiations required with the neighboring property
owners and residents, as well as with the appropriate governmental authorities. (R. 218,118-10,
12; R. 344, 110; R. 346, 114). The trial court also ignored the evidence presented by both
parties that Russell flatly refused to deal with Coulter & Smith after November 1992 (R. 220,
117; R. 71, 115). These are all facts that Coulter & Smith is entitled to prove at trial. As a
result of ignoring these facts, the trial court improperly found that since annexation and
development had not been completed by January 1995, a reasonable time had passed without
exercise of the option. The trial court's ruling on this issue should be reversed, and the issue
of what constituted a reasonable time be remanded for trial.
ffl.

THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES.

The trial court also erroneously ruled as a matter of law that the Agreement may not be
specifically enforced because it violates the rule against perpetuities (R. 455-56; Conclusions of
Law Nos. 3 and 4). The Agreement does not, however, violate this rule for, based upon the
extrinsic evidence, the parties clearly knew that the Agreement was for the forthwith
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development of the 3.67-Acre Parcel and that consummation of the transaction was to take place
within a reasonable time frame. As set forth above, what constituted a "reasonable" time frame
was a question of fact that the trial court should not have resolved on summary judgment. And
if, as Coulter & Smith's evidence indicates, the property was to be transferred within the
perpetuities period, then the rule against perpetuities has not been violated.
A.

THE

RULE

AGAINST

PERPETUITIES

DOES NOT

APPLY

TO

CONTRACTS IF PERFORMANCE IS TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME FRAME WITHIN THE PERPETUITIES PERIOD.

The rule against perpetuities provides that: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if
at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." Anderson
v. Anderson, 386 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1963) (citations omitted). The rule "grew up as a
limitation on family dispositions of property," Rodin v. Merritt, 48 N.C.App. 64, 68; 268
S.E.2d 539, 542 (1980), but has been sharply curtailed in modern times when sought to be
applied to commercial transactions:
Rules which bear such birthmarks assume a different aspect when they are applied
to contracts or leases in a modern society whose economic structure rests upon
planning for the future and whose life blood is credit. Since the rule against
perpetuities was born in a society which extolled the tight ownership of inherited
real property, it does not facilely operate as to commercial agreements in today's
dynamic economy.
Id, quoting Wong v. DiGrazia. 35 Cal. Rptr. 241, 247, 386 P.2d 817, 823 (1963).
The Rodin court was addressing a commercial transaction which was remarkably similar
to the one before this Court.

In Rodin, the plaintiffs sought specific performance of an

agreement for the sale of land. Title was to vest only after fulfillment of certain conditions,
including, inter alia, having the property rezoned and annexed to the city, obtaining
governmental approvals and building permits required for the desired development, obtaining
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satisfactory evidence of available water supply and sewage disposal, and filing all required
subdivision plats or site plans. The contract did not set a date for transfer of title. The trial
court had refused to enforce the contract as violative of the rule against perpetuities. The Rodin
court, however, reversed the trial court and noted that where the time for performance is not
specified within the contract,
. . . the law will prescribe that performance must be within a reasonable time and
that the contract will continue for a reasonable time, "taking into account the
purposes the parties intended to accomplish." [citations omitted]. "In case of an
executory contract of sale, where the time for the execution of the conveyance or
transfer is not limited, the law implies that it is to be done within a reasonable
time. . . . " [citations omitted]
Rodin v. Merritt 48 N.C.App. at 71-72; 268 S.E.2d at 544. Thus, the Rodin court held that
the subject sales agreement did not violate the rule against perpetuities. IdL
In reaching this holding, the Rodin court relied heavily on Wong v. DiGrazia, supra.
As the Rodin court explained, in Wong, the parties had entered into a 10-year lease that would
commence when the building construction was completed. The lessor's obligation to construct
was subject to a variety of conditions, including obtaining governmental approvals of plans and
specifications.
The agreement required the lessor to begin construction "forthwith" upon
approval of the plans and to "continue expeditiously." The fWongl Court wrote
a very scholarly discussion of the Rule Against Perpetuities and noted:
Not only have the courts evolved exceptions to the rule, but the doctrine
as to performance within a reasonable time constitutes in itself one such
exception. Courts and scholars almost unanimously agree that provisions
which make vesting contingent upon performance within a reasonable
time, or some equivalent phrase, do not violate the rule "if, in the light
of the surrounding circumstances, as a matter of construction 'a
reasonable time' is necessarily less than twenty-one years." (3 Simes &
Smith, Future Interests (2d ed. 1956) § 1228 at p. 122.) Many courts, in
fact, presume that a "reasonable time" is less than the period of the rule.
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In any event, a reasonable time in the present transaction, in the light of
the circumstances, must necessarily be a period far less than 21 years.
Rodin v. Merritt 48 N.C.App. at 70-71; 268 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting Wong v. DiGrazia. 35 Cal.
Rptr. at 249-50, 386 P.2d at 825-26). Thus, in the context of modern commercial transactions,
the rule against perpetuities does not apply if performance is to take place within a reasonable
time, which time period itself is within the perpetuities period.
While Utah courts have not addressed the rule against perpetuities in a similar context,
Utah courts have held that where a contract is silent as to the time for performance, the law will
imply that performance take place within a reasonable period of time. Cooper v. Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 757 P.2d 483 (Utah 1988). This concept has been upheld even
when the transfer of real property interests is at issue. For example, in Bradford v. Alvev &
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that even though no time was
specified in an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the buyers to seek and obtain financing:
. . . when a provision in a contract requires an act to be performed without
specifying the time, the law implies that it is to be done within a reasonable time
under the circumstances, and in case of controversy, that is something for the
trial court to determine.
IcL at 1252. Similarly, in Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah App.
1987), the Utah Court of Appeals construed a lease agreement that required a lessee to undertake
certain tasks prior to the lessor's obligation to construct the buildings and then lease them to the
lessee. In dictum, the appellate court recognized that while the agreement contained no "time
is of the essence" provision, that the lessee "had a reasonable time under the circumstances in
which to satisfy the conditions precedent." Id. at 280, fn. 3.
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Therefore, while the Utah courts have not specifically addressed this issue in the context
of the rule against perpetuities, they have acknowledged that in the context of a real estate
transaction, a reasonable time for performance can be determined from the surrounding
circumstances. It follows that if that reasonable time is within the perpetuities period, then the
rule against perpetuities does not apply.
To determine what constitutes a reasonable period of time is determined by looking at
all of the facts and circumstances to ascertain what time was contemplated by the parties.
Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 1980). This is a question of fact to be
resolved after hearing all the extrinsic evidence. Culp v. Tri-Countv Tractor. Inc.. 736 P.2d
1348, 1354 (Idaho App. 1987). Here, a ruling upon the reasonableness of the time period within
which the Agreement was to have been consummated must await a trial on the disputed facts.
The trial court's finding that January 1995 was a reasonable time period was improper on
summary judgment, because it ignored Coulter & Smith's evidence that Russell refused to deal
with Coulter & Smith for most of that time period, and thereby breached the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court's ruling must therefore be reversed and the issue
remanded for trial. Moreover, the trial court should also be instructed that if the time period
within which these parties contemplated consummation of the Agreement was within the
perpetuities period, then the Agreement did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
B.

THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE
"REASONABLE" TIME ISSUE.

The fact that the trial court actually did make a factual finding as to the reasonableness
of the time period between 1991 and January 1995 is a further indication that the rule against
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perpetuities has not been violated. It was, as a matter of law, improper on summary judgment
for the trial court to make this factual finding. But the trial court can and should, on remand
and after trial, make a factual finding as to the time period within which the parties contemplated
the option being exercised. The trial court's own (improper) factual finding was that four years,
i.e., the time between when the Agreement was signed (R. 217, t1f2, 3) and January 1995, was
a reasonable time period for the option to be exercised. The perpetuities period is lives in being
plus 21 years. Four years is well within the perpetuities period. Thus, according to the trial
court's own (improper) factual finding, the option could not have been exercised outside the
perpetuities period. It follows that the option did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling is internally inconsistent.
If, after remand and on trial, the trial court were to rule that four years was the time
period within which the option should have been exercised, then Coulter & Smith is entitled to
prove that it could not exercise the option because Russell himself breached the Agreement and
refused to deal with Coulter & Smith after November 1992. (R. 219-20, ft 14-17).
Thus, the trial court's (improper) factual finding aptly demonstrates why the rule against
perpetuities has not been violated in this case.
IV.

THE AGREEMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE
CONSIDERATION.

The trial court also erroneously found, despite disputed evidence, that the Agreement was
not supported by any consideration:
11. Coulter & Smith paid no money and furnished no consideration for
the purported option at the outset of the option.
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(R. 455, Finding of Fact No. 11). Based upon this improper factual finding, the trial court
erroneously concluded as a matter of law:
5. The purported option is not valid in that it was not supported by
consideration at the outset.
While no money may have exchanged hands between Coulter & Smith and Russell, there
was ample consideration given for the Agreement. Prior to entering into the Agreement, Coulter
& Smith had no obligation to incorporate the 3.67-Acre Parcel into its own development or to
attempt to resolve Russell's development problems. Coulter & Smith had already engineered
its own development. (R. 218, f9; R. 345, f 12). As a result of the Agreement, Coulter &
Smith became obligated to re-engineer its own development to resolve development problems
created by the 3.67-Acre Parcel. IcL While Russell had previously hired engineers to design
a layout for the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a stand-alone subdivision, he had encountered some major
development obstacles, including the lack of a storm drain outlet, undefined routing for sanitary
sewer, and problems with access. (R. 218, f7; R. 344, fll). Based upon the Agreement
between Coulter & Smith and Russell, the development problems that Russell had encountered
were resolved. Coulter & Smith's efforts to resolve these difficulties were extensive, and in part
included a redesign of the subdivision to incorporate the 3.67-Acre Parcel, negotiation with the
Sandy City engineer for the required routing and approvals, and deepening the sanitary sewer
to allow for hookups to the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 345, f 12; 218, 1f 8, 9). Coulter & Smith
expended more than $50,000.00 on changes made to the sanitary and storm drainage systems
as a result of incorporating the 3.67-Acre Parcel into the overall subdivision. (R. 219, fll).
None of these expenditures or efforts to resolve the development problems of Russell's 3.67acres would have been undertaken without the Agreement. (R. 345, 112).
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Legal consideration need not be found in the exchange of money only.

Legal

consideration may consist of:
. . . some benefit to the promisor; or of some loss, injury, or inconvenience to
the promisee; or of some money or other thing of value given, exchanged, or
paid; or of some promise or undertaking of the promisee to pay, give, or
exchange such thing of value, or to incur some trouble or expense, or to do or
not do some lawful act, or to surrender, abandon, or suspend the exercise of
some legal right. . . .
77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser §35 (1975). This concept is well recognized in Utah:
Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a
promise. Promises made by a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to do an act
or to forbear from doing an act that would be detrimental to the promisor or
beneficial to the promisee may constitute the consideration for the other's
promise.
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036
(Utah 1985). The consideration given by Coulter & Smith for the Agreement with Russell was
its promise to resolve Russell's development difficulties by incorporating the 3.67-Acre Parcel
into Coulter & Smith's overall development plan.
The only evidence Russell submitted that no consideration had been given for the
Agreement was his testimony that (1) no money had exchanged hands (R. 70, f8), and (2) that
he had received no benefit as a result of Coulter & Smith's efforts (R. 262, f6). While Coulter
& Smith acknowledges that no money was exchanged, such consideration was unnecessary.
Coulter & Smith promised to do something beneficial for Russell, i.e., work on resolving
Russell's development problems. That promise in itself was sufficient consideration for the
Agreement. Thus, the trial court's conclusion of law that no consideration passed at the outset
of the Agreement must be reversed.
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The trial court's factual conclusion that Russell received no benefit as a result of Coulter
& Smith's efforts is disputed. Russell attested that he received no benefit. Coulter and Smith
indicated that regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit, Russell would have the use and benefit
of many of Coulter & Smith's efforts. (R. 345-46, f 13). The trial court should not have
resolved this factual dispute on summary judgment. This finding should be reversed and the
matter remanded for trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this J ^

da

Y o f December, 1995.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Richard A. Rappaport
Leslie Van Frank
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Coulter & Smith, Ltd.
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APPENDIX I

Coulter S Smith, Ltd

April 23, 1991

Dr. Roger Russell
10894 So* Whirlaway Lane
Sandy, UT 84093
Dear Dr. Russell:
In response to your request for a written proposal to purchase
your lots west of 1700 East at 10800 South, I submit the following offer which you may accept by signing below:
Price: $26,500 per lot during the 1st month following
completion
of the lots; price of each lot to increase $100 per lot each
month thereafter until each lot is closed.
Upon completion of the subdivision development we offer to pay
you $1,500 per lot; the balance of the purchase price ($25,000 at
the outset) to be paid upon closing of each lot. We understand
that the cost of the land and the lot improvements will be paid
upon closing of each lot.
The enclosed Work Exchange Agreement will initiate our cooperative efforts. We will proceed posthaste to annex and develop our
tracts jointly. I believe that working in concert will greatly
facilitate zoning and all other development concerns.

Respectfully,

Nathan Coulter

pmp
Coulter & Smith Ltd. is hereby granted an option to purchase lots
as per terms detailed above: Th.-j o^f'orv f e r ^ ' K o ^ £/ears c^:*v f/^
date Qf COKtofc-fi'fr*- 0£ ik^zKlxltui'Si'o*
.

y^k-

f^«»6/

¥-??-<?/

D r . RWer R u s s e l l

1991

Date

9894 South 2300 €ast
Sandy. Utoh 84092
/OAI

\

A/I^

^rn/t

C V U I D I T **A *
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APPENDIX II

Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690)
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COULTER & SMITH, LTD., a Nevada
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 940905806PR

ROGER RUSSELL and ROGER
RICHARDS,
Defendants.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

This matter having come on before the Court on Defendant Roger Russell's
("Russell") Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Court having
heard the argument of counsel at hearing on April 18, 1995, in which Richard A. Rappaport of
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Michael Zundel and Adam
Affleck appeared on behalf of Defendant Roger Russell, the Court having reviewed the briefs,
affidavits, and other materials submitted by the parties, and having otherwise determined to grant

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Russell's Motion, the Court hereby sets forth the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Complaint of Plaintiff Coulter & Smith, Ltd. ("Coulter & Smith")

seeks enforcement of a purported option to purchase certain real property.
2.

The purported option refers to a 3.67 acre parcel owned (or controlled)

by Russell located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

The purported option provides for the sale of "lots" to be developed by

Coulter & Smith on the Property.
4.

The purported option does not specify how many lots are to be developed

on the Property so that the ultimate size and number of the lots to be sold (or controlled) is
uncertain, as is the price to be paid for the entire parcel.
5.

No transfer of lots was contemplated by the parties until after Coulter &

Smith completed subdivision development of the Property.
6.

The purported option does not provide an outside date by which it must

7.

The purported option required Coulter & Smith to "post hast" annex and

be exercised.

develop subdivision lots on the property.
8.

The purported option was granted in April, 1991.

9.

As of January, 1995 Coulter & Smith has failed to annex or develop the

Property.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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10.

A reasonable time for exercise of the option has passed.

11.

Coulter & Smith paid no money and furnished no consideration for the

purported option at the outset of the option.
12.

Coulter & Smith did work to estaonsn a subdivision, but it was not work

done strictly to enhance the value of the Property.
13.

Coulter & Smith's work to establish a subdivision was not a detriment to

Coulter & Smith because it enhanced the value of its own property.
14.

Russell withdrew any offer to sell lots when Russell attempted to sell the

Property to the LDS Church in November, 1992.
15.

The Court makes no factual finding as to Coulter & Smith's alleged post-

signing alteration of the purported option.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Although the legal description of the overall parcel owned by Russell is

sufficient, the purported option is deficient as to the number of lots and as to the price to be
paid, and therefore, the purported option is unenforceable.
2.

The purported option does not violate state and local laws against selling

subdivision lots prior to obtaining governmental approval because no lots were to be sold until
the property was legally subdivided.
3.

The purported option violates the rule against perpetuities because there

is no provision as to the date by which it must be exercised.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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4.

Plaintiff's argument that the purported option must be exercised within a

"reasonable time" is rejected because it leaves wide open when a "reasonable time" is. The fact
that the purported option said plaintiff would proceed "post haste" to annex and develop the
property and it has not been done by January 1995 is more evidence that there is no cutoff date
and thus the rule against perpetuities has been violated.
4.

Any offer to sell created by the purported option has been withdrawn.

5.

The purported option is not valid in that it was not supported by

consideration at the outset.
6.

A reasonable time for purchasing has passed and the purchase has not

7.

Any option created by the purported option has lapsed because a reasonable

taken place.

time has passed.
8.

Russell's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted and judgment

entered in Russell's favor.
DATED this / ^ d a v of^Sl?1995.
BY THE COURT:

y^f-y^x^onorable Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
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following:
Michael Zundel, Esq.
John N. Brems, Esq.
Adam S. Affleck, Esq.
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Defendants
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690)
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COULTER & SMITH, LTD., a Nevada
corporation,
Plaintiff,

3ACo(oH-3
AMENDED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, NUNC PRO TUNC

vs.

ROGER RUSSELL, ROGER RICHARDS,
and KRISTIN RUSSELL,
Defendants.

Civil No. 940905806PR

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

This matter having come on before the Court on January 18, 1995, upon motion
for summary judgment regularly made by the Defendant, Roger Russell ("Russell"), to dismiss
the above-captioned action on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that Russell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; Michael N. Zundel and Adam S.
Affleck appeared on behalf of Defendants and Richard A. Rappaport appeared on behalf of
Plaintiff; the Court having considered the briefs, affidavits and other materials submitted by the

Amended Summary Judgment, Nunc Pro Tunc
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parties and having considered the arguments of counsel for the respective parties, and after due
deliberation having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Clerk
of the Court having previously erroneously entered Summary Judgment on April 18, 1995, and
the Court having previously entered Summary Judgment on May 16, 1995, the parties having
stipulated to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc, and for good cause otherwise appearing, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the Summary Judgments entered on April 18, 1995 and May 16,
1995 be and hereby are VACATED; and it is further hereby
ORDERED that Kristin Russell be and hereby is made a party defendant to this
lawsuit, but only for purposes of plaintiffs quiet title action and any appeal thereof; and it is
further hereby
ORDERED that Russell's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby
is, granted; and it is further hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Coulter & Smith, Ltd., has no
claim to or interest in the real property which is the subject of this action and which is more
particularly described below. The claims and causes of action described in the complaint filed
by Coulter & Smith, Ltd. commencing this action are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits; and it is further
ORDERED that there being no just reason for delay, the clerk of the court is
instructed to immediately enter this judgment as a final judgment of the court.
Located in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.

Amended Summary Judgment, Nunc Pro Tunc
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Beginning at a point which is East 1760 feet and South 47°06'
East 271.4 feet and South 1536 feet from the Northwest corner of
the Southwest quarter, of Section 16, Township 3 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 414.5
feet; thence North 130 feet; thence East 66 feet; thence North 47
feet; thence East 179.5 feet; thence North 50 feet; thence West
153 feet; thence North 103 feet; thence West 507 feet; thence
South 330 feet to the point of beginning.
and it is further
ORDERED that this Summary Judgment be entered as of May 16,1995, nunc pro
tunc.
DATED this /

day of June, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

/Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
/ District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^

F\cbg\couIrus.jud

Amended Summary Judgment, Nunc Pro Tunc

Page 3

APPENDIX IV
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ORIGINAL
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

COULTER & SMITH, LTD., a
Nevada corporation,

5
6
7

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER RUSSELL and ROGER
RICHARDS,

8
Defendants.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS: COURT'S
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
1-18-95
Civil No. 940905806PR
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson

9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 24th day of

12

January, 1995, the above-entitled matter came on for

13

Hearing in chambers area of Courtroom No. 502 of the

14

Court's Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East

15

400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the Honorable Homer

16

F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third Judicial District, State

17

of Utah.

18
19

A P P E A R A N C E S
Richard A. Rappaport. Attorney-at-Law,

20

Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C., 525 East First South, Fifth

21

Floor, P.O. Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008,

22

telephone 532-2666, appearing telephonically and on behalf

23

of the plaintiff.

24
25

Messrs. Michael N. Zundel, Attorney-at-Law;
and Adam s. Affleck. Attorney-at-Law, Jardine, Linebaugh,

1

1

Brown & Dunn, 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt Lake

2

City, Utah 84111, telephone 532-7700, appearing

3 || telephonically and on behalf of the defendants.

4
5
6
7
8
9

1

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were

2

had of record:)

3

THE COURT:

4

Do I have Mike Zundel and Rick

Rappaport?

5

MR. RAPPAPORT:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. ZUNDEL:

Yes,

Good afternoon, Judge.

Good afternoon.
Yes, your Honor.

I have with

8

me Adam Affleck, but I have you on a speakerphone, if

9

that's all right.

10

THE COURT:

That's fine, and you're on a

11

speakerphone here, and I do have a reporter present.

12

want to give you my decision in this Coulter & Smith versus

13

Roger Russell case.

14

case again, and the Court is going to look at the reply

15

memorandum of the defendants as to the issues that I'm

16

going to rule on as far as preparing your Findings of Fact

17

and Conclusions of Law.

18

I

I've reviewed your memoranda, and the

The first one that—let's see, is that the

19

defendant claims the purported option lacks a property

20

description sufficient to support an enforceable contract

21

or meet the statute of frauds and is void.

22

find that the property description, where it refers to it

23

as "the lot" or property owned by Russell, that that was

24

sufficient, but it's lacking where it says that it will be

25

sold "by lots."

The Court would

1

It provides that there is to be paid "so

2

much for each lot," but that does not provide for how many

3

lots, and therefore it's deficient as to the description as

4

to the number of lots and as to the price that is going to

5

be paid and leaves it open and would be unenforceable.

6

The second area they're complaining about is

7

that Utah and local law provide that no interests in

8

subdivision lots may be sold prior to governmental approval

9

making the purported option illegal and void.

Well, the

10

Court would find that that is true as far as the local law

11

is concerned, but would deny their request on this point:

12

That the lots, if they were established, and then they were

13

going to be sold according to lots, the Court would find

14

it's not in violation of that particular provision.

15

No. 3 is the purported option violates the

16

rule against perpetuities.

17

option agreement does violate the rule of perpetuities—

18

against perpetuities in that there is no provision to set

19

this particular option as to date it must be exercised,

20

that if it was argued at the trial by counsel that there

21

would be a reasonable time, that that is a question of what

22

is "reasonable" then, but it leaves it wide open as to when

23

it could happen.

24
25

The Court would find that the

And in fact the option was granted I
believe, as I recall my notes, in April of 1991, and it

1

provided that it would proceed "post haste11 to annex and

2

develop the tract, and it is now January of 1995, and it

3

has not been done, which is more proof or evidence that

4

there is no cutoff date and it violates the rule against

5

perpetuities.

6

The Court would further find that the

7

question of what is a reasonable time in most situations is

8

normally a question of fact.

9

situation here, in view of the provision in the option that

JO

it would proceed "post haste," that a "reasonable time" has

11

passed and that it has not been done.

12

The Court would find in this

The next one, No. 4 is that any offer to

13

sell created by the purported option has been withdrawn.

14

And that raises a question whether the option was valid and

15

whether it was just an offering and it had been withdrawn.

16

And the Court would find that the option is

17

not a valid option, it was not supported by consideration

18

at th e outset.

19

Counsel argues that the consideration

20

furnished at a later date, the alleged consideration

21

furnished at a later date was sufficient, but the Court

22

would find even in the affidavit of Mr. Coulter and the

23

memorandum of counsel it's indicated that nothing had been

24

done to improve this property, that work had been done to

25

establish a subdivision, but it had not been work which was

1

strictly to enhance the value of this property.

2

It was not a detriment to Mr. Coulter in any

3

way, but it enhanced his property as far as the subdivision

4

was concerned, and the Court, as I say, would find that

5

there was no consideration again for the option, but the

6

option was not a valid option.

7

That any offer that was made was withdrawn

8

in November of 1992 when the attempt was made to sell the

9

property to the LDS Church.

10

No. 5, Coulter & Smith's post-signing

11

alteration rejected the purported option and renders it

12

unenforceable.

13

That's a question of fact as to who put that in there.

14

It's disputed, and the Court would deny their summary

15

judgment on that basis.

16

The Court would deny it on those grounds.

No. 6, any option created by the purported

17

option has lapsed, I think that a reasonable time has

18

passed, as I've already indicated.

19

a reasonable time has passed, and that it has not been

20

done.

21

If there was an option,

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court

22

would grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment;

23

however, in the form of a summary judgment, not in the form

24

of a motion to dismiss, and that the defendant shall

25

prepare the necessary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

1

Law based on my decision•

2
3

MR. ZUNDEL:

Any questions?
Will the Court expunge the lis

pendens?

4

MR. RAPPAPORT:

Your Honor, we're going to

5

probably appeal this, and I don't think that the Court made

6

its ruling—I don't think that the Court should be ruling

7

on the issue of the lis pendens.

8

notice that a case has been filed, and we're going to be

9

appealing this ruling.

10

MR. ZUNDEL:

The lis pendens is a

It's a lien, and if they want

11

to stay this Court's order expunging the lis pendens, they

12

know how to do it; post a bond.

13

MR. RAPPAPORT:

The lis pendens is something

14

we're allowed to file to say that a case is pending, and if

15

the Court is ruling on the summary judgment, that's one

16

thing.

17

pendens.

18

has a right to expunge the lis pendens while an appeal .is

19

pending.

20

I don't think it was asked to expunge the lis
We surely didn't brief as to whether the Court

THE COURT:

Let me state this, that in view

21

of my ruling, no, a motion has not been made to release the

22

lis pendens, but if a motion were to be made, then I would

23

grant that motion striking the lis pendens, in view of the

24

ruling.

25 [I

I would have no alternative but to do that.
What counsel, Mr. Rappaport, you do as far
7
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1

as your appeal and motion for stay, that would be something

2

you would have to do, and I would have to make that

3

determination.

4

that I'm granting the motion for summary judgment.

5

the two of you do as far as the lis pendens and the motion

6

for stay, that would be up to you.

So I guess what I'm saying right now is

7

MR. ZUNDEL:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RAPPAPORT:

What

Thank you, your Honor.
Anything else?
No, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RAPPAPORT:

12

(Whereupon, at the hour of 1:55 p.m., the

1 3 I)

proceedings came to a close.)

14
15
16
17
18
19

Thank you, counsel.
Thank you, your Honor,

1
2
3
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